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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAHf ; 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 900284-CA 
v. : 
MICHAEL SAMUEL WEAVER, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of theft, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990), as the appeal is from a 
district court in a criminal case not involving a conviction of a 
first degree felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court correctly determine that the 
affidavit in support of the search warrant established probable 
cause for the search of defendant's mother's residence? The 
standard of review to examine a trial court's determination of 
the sufficiency of an affidavit in support of a search warrant is 
whether the lower court was clearly in error. State v. 
Stromberqf 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert, denied, 
795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies is included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On May 15, 1989, defendant was arrested and charged 
with one count of burglary, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990) and one count of theft, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 
(1990) (Record [hereafter R.] at 9). On September 27, 1989, 
defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence* seized from the 
premises at 1316 East 3900 South (R. at 33). Subsequently, on 
October 17, 1989, defendant entered into a plea agreement in 
which count I was dismissed and defendant entered a conditional 
guilty plea to theft, a second degree felony, and agreed to pay 
restitution (R. at 39-45). However, on November 13, 1989, the 
trial court allowed defendant to withdraw his guilty plea and the 
case was remanded to the Circuit Court for preliminary hearing 
(R. at 49). 
On February 26, 1990, defendant pled not guilty to 
counts I and II as originally charged in the information (R. at 
51). Following a suppression hearing on March 15, 1990, the 
trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress (R. at 52-53). 
The matter was tried by jury on March 27 and 28, 1990, in the 
Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, the Honorable 
J. Dennis Frederick, district judge, presiding (R. at 89-90). 
The jury found defendant guilty of theft, a third degree felony, 
a lesser included offense of count II of the information (R. at 
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95). Defendant was sentenced on April 9, 1990 to a term in the 
Utah State Prison not to exceed five years (R. at 123). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 7, 1989, Deputy Gary Cummings of the Salt Lake 
County Sheriff's Department was dispatched to Dustyfs Vans at 
3405 South State in response to a call made by the security guard 
(Transcript of the trial [hereafter R. 147] at 13). Shortly 
after his arrival, Deputy Cummings was met by Dave Torgerson, the 
shop service manager (R. 147 at 14, 20). They found that the 
front door had been pried open, a candy machine had been broken 
into, and televisions and videocassette players had been removed 
from a shelf (R. 147 at 21-22). During a follow-up investigation 
conducted by Deputy Les Powers, Mr. Torgerson completed an 
inventory of the missing items and their value (R. 147 at 23-24). 
Around noon on May 7, 1989 some of the business's 
employees spoke with Jay and Linda Lawrence to see if they had 
seen or heard anything regarding the burglary (R. 147 at 46-47). 
The Lawrences lived in a four-plex at 3391 South Edison Street, 
directly behind Dusty's Vans (R. 147 at 43). Upon learning that 
the Lawrences had both seen and spoken with defendant, the 
employees notified the police (R. 147 at 47). The Lawrences then 
described their encounter with defendant to Deputy Gary Sterner 
(R. 147 at 50). Mrs. Lawrence explained that she was awakened 
early on the morning of May 7, 1989 by the clanking of the fence 
outside her bedroom window (R. 147 at 43). When she looked out, 
she saw a man climbing back and forth over the fence to Dusty's, 
carrying items (R. 147 at 44). Mrs. Lawrence then awakened her 
husband (R. 147 at 45). He reported: 
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Well, I saw this guy jumping over a fence, 
throwing things over, and then jumping over, 
and I yelled something like, "Hey, what's 
going on over there?" 
• • • 
He walked up to the lawn and — let's see, he 
says, "These people," referring to Dusty's 
Vans, "had ripped me off and I'm just getting 
back at them." 
• • • 
He went over and threw his stuff into his 
truck, the last, you know, little load that 
he was carrying, and drove off. 
(R. 147 at 35). Both Mr. and Mrs. Lawrence described defendant 
as wearing a tank top, tennis shoes and either shorts or cut-offs 
on the morning of the burglary (R. 147 at 36, 47). They also 
described defendant's truck as "a blue, small truck . . . [that] 
didn't have license plates on it" and "a blue Mitsubishi truck 
with a new sticker in the window" (R. 147 at 36, 46). At trial, 
the Lawrences each identified defendant as the man they saw 
jumping the fence and removing property from Dusty's Vans on the 
morning of May 7, 1989 (R. 147 at 36, 45). 
On May 7, 1989, Deputy Sterner investigated the 
burglary at Dusty's Vans (R. 147 at 49-50). As part of that 
investigation, he spoke with Dave Torgerson and interviewed Mr. 
and Mrs. Lawrence (R. 147 at 50). At five-thirty that afternoon, 
Deputy Sterner saw a truck similar to that described by the 
Lawrences (R. 147 at 50). The driver of the truck also fit the 
description of defendant given by the Lawrences (R. 147 at 51). 
Deputy Sterner stated: 
I followed [the truck] and then made a 
traffic stop, pulled it over and obtained ID 
from the driver. 
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[The name was] Michael S. Weaver. 
• • • 
I just asked him where he was going, asked 
him for his ID. I went back and ran the ID 
for warrants, returned it to him and let him 
go. 
. • • 
I wrote out a field card, added that to my 
report and sent a note in to the deputies — 
or detective division. 
(R. 147 at 51-52). 
On May 11, 1989, after receiving the report from Deputy 
Sterner, Detective Powers displayed a photo spread for the 
Lawrences in which both Jay and Linda Lawrence positively 
identified defendant as the person they had seen on the morning 
of the burglary (R. 147 at 54-55). Detective Powers also 
contacted defendant's parole officer, Sally Powell, and had her 
check the records on defendant's electronic surveillance (R. 147 
at 69). Those records showed that defendant left his home at 
6:24 on the morning of May 7, 1989 (R. 147 at 70). Ms. Powell 
also told Detective Powers that defendant frequented his mother's 
residence which was near his own residence (R. 147 at 56). Based 
to this information, Detective Powers sought a search warrant to 
check defendant's mother's residence for any of the stolen items 
(R. 147 at 56). Detective Powers obtained a search warrant in 
the third circuit court for Salt Lake County (Defendant's Exhibit 
[hereafter Def. Exh.] #1; a copy is attached as Addendum A). The 
warrant was executed on May 12, 1989 (R. 147 at 56). At 
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defendant's mother's residence, officers found a five-inch Cosmo 
TV in the home and various televisions and videocassette players 
in a shed adjacent to the carport (R. 147 at 58-59 and State's 
Exhibit [hereafter St. Exh.] # 5, 6, and 7). Those items were 
identified as coming from the burglary of Dusty's Vans (R. 147 at 
29-30). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Since the Utah Supreme Court has specifically adopted 
the Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), totality-of-the-
circumstances test for challenges to search warrant affidavits, 
this issue need not be analyzed separately under the Utah 
Constitution. Using the Gates test, this affidavit provides 
sufficient information to establish probable cause for issuance 
of the warrant. The hypertechnical dissection that defendant 
attempts to make of the affidavit on appeal has been rejected by 
this jurisdiction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT ESTABLISHED 
SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE TO SUPPORT THE 
ISSUANCE OF THE SEARCH WARRANT 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying 
his motion to suppress evidence resulting from a search of his 
mother's residence. He asserts that the affidavit for the search 
warrant issued for his mother's residence was invalid and 
therefore issued in violation of his state and federal 
constitutional rights. 
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A. Standard of Review 
Defendant raised his invalidity of the affidavit 
argument in a suppression hearing before the trial court on March 
15, 1990. The trial court denied defendant's motion stating: 
This court is of the view that thte 
[sic] affidavit in support of the warrant 
contains sufficient reliable information to 
have provied [sic] the magistrate with a 
substantial basis for determining the 
existence of probable cause. The magistrate 
was able to make a reasonable determination 
that there was a fair probability that 
evidence of a crime would be found at the 
residence identified. 
This court is not prusuaded [sic] that 
those executing the warrant exceeded their 
authority. 
(Record [hereafter R.] at 53). To overturn this ruling, this 
Court must find that the trial court's factual evaluation 
underlying its decision to deny defendant's motion to suppress 
was clearly erroneous. This Court addressed the standard of 
review in State v. Stromberq, 783 P.2d 54 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), 
cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990): 
When a search warrant is subsequently 
challenged on the grounds that it was issued 
without the requisite probable cause . . . 
"the fourth amendment does not require that 
the reviewing court conduct a de novo review 
of the magistrate's probable cause 
determination." [State v.] Babbell, 770 P.2d 
[987] at 991 [(Utah 1989)]. Rather, the 
determination is "whether the magistrate had 
a substantial basis to conclude that in the 
totality of circumstances, the affidavit 
adequately established probable cause for the 
issuance of a search warrant." State v. 
Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 129 (Utah 1987). 
Moreover, in making this determination, the 
reviewing court is to give the magistrate's 
decision "great deference." Ld. (quoting 
Gates, 462 U.S. at 236). 
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Our role in reviewing that determination is 
limited: "Because a trial court is in an 
advantageous position to assess witness 
credibility, 'we will not disturb its factual 
assessment underlying a decision to . . . 
deny a suppression motion unless it clearly 
appears that the lower court was in error.'" 
[State v.3 Droneberg, 120 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 
28 [(Utah Ct. App. October 20, 1989)] 
(quoting State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 
(Utah 1987)). Clear error is indicated when 
the trial court's factual assessment is 
against the clear weight of the evidence or 
induces a firm conviction that a mistake has 
been committed. Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1258. 
783 P.2d at 57. The record in the present case supports the 
finding of the trial court. Since the trial court's ruling 
upholding the search warrant is not clearly erroneous, this Court 
should defer to the trial court's determination. 
B. Probable Cause Determination 
Defendant analyzes his challenge to the trial court's 
probable cause determination separately under the United States 
and the Utah Constitutions, based on his interpretation of State 
v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990). Larocco involves 
warrantless searches and expresses concern felt by the Utah 
Supreme Court with the direction federal law is moving on that 
issue. The courts of this state have never expressed a similar 
concern about the Gates totality-of-the-circumstances test. In 
fact, this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have specifically 
adopted and applied that test. See State v. Brown, 143 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 24 (Utah Ct. App. Sep. 12, 1990); State v. Anderton, 668 
P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1983); State v. Anderson, 701 P-2d 1099, 
1101 (Utah 1985). The courts of this state have expressed 
concern over exceptions to the warrant requirement; they have 
_ Q _ 
never expressed concern over the test used to evaluate probable 
cause determinations. See Stromberg, 783 P.2d at 57. 
Consequently, the State will cite to and analyze both federal and 
state law in support of the trial court's determination that this 
affidavit established probable cause. 
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution 
and article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution both require a 
finding of "probable cause supported by oath or affirmation" 
prior to issuance of a search warrant. State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 
1363, 1365 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 
1987). Accordingly, probability, not conclusive evidence, is the 
basis upon which a search warrant may be issued. When the Utah 
Supreme Court addressed the issue of probable cause in State v. 
Tapp, 26 Utah 2d 392, 490 P.2d 334 (1971), it stated: 
[I]t is not necessary that the affiant have 
certain knowledge of the commission of crime 
or of the location of evidence incident 
thereto. It is only required that there be 
sufficient knowledge of the probability 
thereof that a person of reason and prudence 
would act thereon. 
490 P.2d at 337. Subsequently, the Court has said, "probability, 
not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard 
of probable cause for issuance of a search warrant." State v. 
Fort, 572 P.2d 1387, 1389 (Utah 1977). See also United States v. 
Dill, 693 F.2d 1012, 1014 (10th Cir. 1982) ("Probable cause for a 
search warrant is nothing more than a reasonable belief that the 
evidence sought is located at the place indicated by the 
policeman's affidavit."). In State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 
(Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court adopted the totality-of-the-
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circumstance analysis espoused by the United States Supreme Court 
in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). In addressing the 
sufficiency of a probable cause finding, the United States 
Supreme Court stated: 
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply 
to make a practical, common-sense decision 
whether, given all the circumstances set 
forth in the affidavit before him, including 
the '•veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of 
persons supplying hearsay information, there 
is a fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be found in a 
particular place. And the duty of a 
reviewing court is simply to ensure that the 
magistrate had a "substantial basis for . . . 
conclud[ing]" that probable cause existed. 
462 U.S. at 238-239 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 
257, 271 (I960)). The Court decried hypertechnical analysis of 
warrants, saying: 
"A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing 
courts toward warrants," Ventresca, 380 U.S., 
at 108, . . . is inconsistent with the Fourth 
Amendment's strong preference for searches 
conducted pursuant to a warrant; "courts 
should not invalidate warrant[s] by 
interpreting affidavit[s] in a 
hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, 
manner." Id.., at 109[.] 
462 U.S. at 236 (other citations omitted). Based on the 
circumstances set forth in the affidavit in question, the issuing 
magistrate in the present case could and did make a probable 
cause determination with a substantial basis for concluding that 
a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing. This is all that 
the fourth amendment and article I, § 14 require. Gates, 462 
U.S. at 237. 
Defendant's argument in the case at bar is based on the 
allegation that in order to justify the search of his mother's 
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residence, the police attempted to form a nexus between 
defendant's residence and his mother's residence • Defendant 
appears to claim that the warrant was issued solely on an 
allegation made by Ms, Sally Powell, "that on May 11, 1989, 
defendant made numerous trips (5-6) between the houses and in 
fact was at the house to be searched on the evening of May 10, 
1989" (Def. Exh. #1, p. 3; also included as Addendum A). This 
dissection of the affidavit which defendant urges on this Court 
is the hypertechnical analysis rejected in Gates, The affidavit, 
viewed in its totality, is not merely Ms, Powell's information. 
Defendant was identified as the person taking items from the 
property of Dusty's Vans. Defendant was on Intensive Supervision 
Parole and his parole officer informed the affiant that defendant 
had made five to six trips between his own residence and that of 
his mother on May 11, 1989. The affiant also had reason to 
believe that defendant could be expecting a search by his parole 
officer at any time; consequently, it was probable that he would 
hide the stolen property at a different location. The close 
proximity of defendant's mother's house to his, coupled with the 
numerous trips between the homes on May 11, gave probable cause 
for the magistrate to allow a search of the mother's residence 
(Def. Exh. #1, p. 3). The fact that there might have been 
At the same time defendant makes his claim that a nexus was 
manufactured by the police, he claims to have a privacy interest 
in the place to be searched (Brief of Appellant at 12, footnote 
5). If, in fact, defendant has a privacy interest in his 
mother's residence, a sufficient nexus exists and defendant 
cannot claim that he had insufficient ties to the place to be 
searched for purposes of establishing probable cause. If 
defendant has no privacy interest in the shed, he has no standing 
to attack the search. 
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innocent explanations for defendant's trips between the homes 
does not negate the finding of probable cause. The law does not 
require a certain knowledge on the part of the affiant or the 
magistrate to justify a search warrant. It only requires 
probable cause. 
Based on the circumstances set forth in the affidavit 
in question, the issuing magistrate could and did make a probable 
cause determination with a substantial basis for concluding that 
a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing. 
POINT II 
EVEN IF THIS SEARCH WARRANT WERE FOUND TO BE 
DEFECTIVE, THE EVIDENCE FOUND IN THE SEARCH 
IS STILL ADMISSIBLE UNDER UNITED STATES V. 
LEON. 
Even if the affidavit did not establish probable cause, 
the evidence is admissible because the officers acted in good 
faith under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), when they 
executed the search warrant. Leon first expressed a good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule for evidence seized pursuant 
to an illegal search. The deterrent effect of exclusion of the 
evidence is aimed at law enforcement agents, not magistrates. 
468 U.S. at 917-18. If a magistrate incorrectly determines that 
probable cause has been established and issues the warrant, an 
officer usually can rely on that determination; punishing an 
officer for the magistrate's error does not accomplish the 
purposes of the exclusionary rule. 468 U.S. at 921-22. However, 
the officer's reliance on the magistrate's determination must be 
"objectively reasonable[.]" 468 U.S. at 922. 
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The Supreme Court listed certain circumstances in which 
the good faith exception would not apply. The Court said: 
Nor would an officer manifest objective good 
faith in relying on a warrant based on an 
affidavit "so lacking in indicia of probable 
cause as to render official belief in its 
existence entirely unreasonable." 
468 U.S. at 923 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11 
(1975)). 
As was noted in Point I, the information given in the 
affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause for issuance 
of the warrant. Even if this court were to find that the 
information given in the affidavit was insufficient to establish 
probable cause, the information is not so lacking a$ to make the 
officers' reliance thereon unreasonable. The courts have 
determined that reliance upon "bare bones" affidavits is 
unreasonable and thus the good faith exception would not apply. 
In Leon, the affidavit "related the results of an extensive 
investigation" and "provided evidence sufficient to create 
disagreement among thoughtful and competent judges as to the 
existence of probable cause." 468 U.S. at 926. Wholly 
conclusory statements in affidavits in previous cases were found 
to be insufficient to establish probable cause. Nathanson v. 
United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933); Aquilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 
(1964). The affidavit in the present case is not so conclusory 
or bare that an objectively reasonable officer would have doubted 
that probable cause existed. The affidavit contained the 
statements of witnesses who identified defendant as the person 
carrying items over the fence from Dusty's Vans; the statement of 
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defendant's parole officer that defendant had made several trips 
between his and his mother's residence on May 11; and a statement 
of the affiant that defendant, a person on intensive supervision 
as part of his parole, would probably hide the stolen property 
away from his own residence. A magistrate and a district court 
judge have determined that this supported a probable cause 
finding. Even assuming arguendo that this was not enough to 
establish probable cause, it was at least sufficient to support 
the officers' good faith reliance on the warrant signed by a 
neutral and detached magistrate. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /i<fe" day of November, 
1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CH&RLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Karen Stam and Ronald S. Fujino, SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC, 
Attorneys for defendant, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111, this ; 5 ~ day of November, 1990. 
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ADDENDUM A 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
County Attorney 
By: GREGORY G. SKORDAS 
Deputy County Attorney 
Courtside Office Building 
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
BEFORE: Sheila McCleve 450 South 2nd East 
JUDGE ADDRESS 
The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That he has reason to believe: 
That on the premises known as 1316 East 3900 South, the 
eastmost unit in a duplex located on 3900 South. The duplex is 
reddish-orange brick with a pink roof and a swamp cooler in the roof. 
In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there 
is now certain property or evidence described as: 
*^ Lt,Two Ninetendo Games (brain and paddles); 
^*0ne Cosmo 5" TV Model CTV 701; 
/"-v .Two Magnavox VCP Model #VR9602AT01; 
\&J*hOne Tote Vision VCP; 
^"One 9" Samsung TV; 
One 9" Sony TV; 
One Alpine AM/FM Cassette Car Stereo (black); 
CA\ •*£ Panasonic Stereo AM/FM Cassette Car Stereo (black); 
\ y rf«*Two Samsong VCP Model VP 2215. 
(Continued on page 2) 2 ^t-vwv<jovr°j 
PAGE 2 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
and that said property or evidence: 
(x) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, or 
(x) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense, or 
(x) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means 
of committing or concealing a public offense, or 
(x) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct, or 
(x) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a party to 
the illegal conduct. [Note requirements of Utah Code 
Annotated, 77-23-3(2)]# 
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is 
evidence of the crime(s) of Burglary, Theft, Receiving Stolen 
Property. 
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant 
are: 
Affiant, Leslie Kent Powers, is a detective with the Salt 
Lake County Sheriff's Office and has been such for 1 1/2 years. 
Affiant has been a deputy Salt Lake County Sheriff for 5 years. 
Affiant is currently assigned as a burglary detective assigned as 
such for the past 1 1/2 years with Salt Lake County. Affiant has had 
extensive training with local law enforcement in the area of burglary 
investigation. 
Affiant has reviewed the report #89-42191 (Initial Report) of 
Deputy Gary Cummings which alleges tht on or about May 7, 1989 
someone entered into the east back building of Dusty's Vans at 3405 
South State in Salt Lake County through the east doors. Entry was 
made by prying a metal door. Joe Torres of Dusty1s Vans reports that 
the forced entry was made between 2300 hours on May 6, 1989 and 1025 
hours on May 7, 1989 and that the items listed above were removed 
from the building, valued at well over $1,000.00. 
Affiant has reviewed the report #89-42191 (follow-up report) 
of Deputy Sterner which alleges that the deputy interviewed Dave 
Torgerson of Dusty1s Vans who located two witnesses to the 
above-referenced burglary. 
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Affiant personally interviewed witnesses Jay Larance and 
Linda Larance who stated that they were awakened at 700 hours on May 
7f 1989 by someone who was jumping back and forth over a fence 
between her residence (apartment) and Dustyfs Vans. Both of these 
witnesses observed the man who then got into a blue Mitsubishi truck, 
with a temporary sticker in the rear window. The man was identified 
as approximately 6f tall, in his 30's with short blonde hair wearing 
shorts and a black tank top. 
Affiant showed both witnesses a photospread including 
Weaver's picture and he was positively identified by both witnesses 
as the man described above, observed climbing the fence to Dusty1s 
Vans. 
Weaver is currently on Intense Supervised Parole for 
Receiving Stolen Property and is supervised by Sally Powell from the 
Department of Corrections. Weaver resides at 1328 East 3900 South 
with his grandmother. Weaver's mother resides at the house to be 
searched. 
Affiant has interviewed Ms. Powell who alleges that on May 
11, 1989, Weaver made numerous trips (5-6) between the houses and in 
fact was at the house to be searched on the evening of May 10, 1989. 
Affiant alleges through his experience and belief that 
Weaver, being on Intense Supervised Parole, would not keep stolen 
property at his primary residence knowing that such a place could and 
is routinely searched by Parole Officers. Further, affiant alleges 
that there is probable cause, because of the above-mentioned 
circumstances and Weaver's activity, to believe that the stolen 
property sought to be seized is located at the property to be 
searched hereby. 
Such evidence would be cancealed, destroyed, damaged, or 
altered if sought by subpoena. A no-knock warrant is not reauested 
here. It is reauested that the home be searched during regular hours 
in a manner least intrusive to other occupants. 
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HEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the 
eizure of said items: 
(x) in the day time. 
UBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME thi 
JUTO IN THE -THlkt) CIRCUIT C W f , 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE 
OF UTAH '•':;,' .-.. 
1S/3445E 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
County Attorney 
By: GREGORY G. SKORDAS 
Deputy County Attorney 
Courtside Office Building 
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
No. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
To any peace officer in the State of Utah. 
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by 
Detective L. Powers - SLCSO, I am satisfied that there is probable 
cause to believe 
That on the premises known as 1316 East 3900 South, the 
eastmost unit in a duplex located on 3900 South. The duplex is 
reddish-orange brick with a pink roof and a swamp cooler in the roof. 
In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there 
is now certain property or evidence .described as: 
Two Ninetendo Games (brain and paddles); 
One Cosmo 5" TV Model CTV 701; 
Two Magnavox VCP Model #VR9602AT0l; 
One Tote Vision VCP; 
One 9" Samsung TV; 
One 9" Sony TV; 
One Alpine AM/FM Cassette Car Stereo (black); 
Panasonic Stereo AM/FM Cassette Car Stereo (black); 
Two Samsong VCP Model VP 2215. 
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and that said property or evidence: 
(x) was unlawfully acauired or is unlawfullv possessed, or 
(x) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense, or 
(x) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means 
of committing or concealing a public offense, or 
(x) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct, or 
(x) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a party to 
the illegal conduct, [Note requirements of Utah Code 
Annotated, 77-23-3(2)] 
You are therefore commanded: 
(x) in the day time 
to make a search of the above-named or described person(s), 
vehicle(s), and premises for the herein-above described property or 
evidence and if you find the same or any part thereof, to bring it 
forthwith before me at the Third Circuit Court, County of Salt Lake, 
State of Utah, or retain such property in your custody, subject to 
the order of this court, 
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this / < ^ day of May. 1989, 
JUDJGE of frit THIRD CIRCUIT COURT 
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